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The human attempts to access, measure and organize physical phenomena have led to a manifold
construction of mathematical and physical spaces. We will survey the evolution of geometries from
Euclid to the Algebraic Geometry of the 20th century. The role of Persian/Arabic Algebra in this transition
and its Western symbolic development is emphasized. In this relation, we will also discuss changes in the
ontological attitudes toward mathematics and its applications. Historically, the encounter of geometric
and algebraic perspectives enriched the mathematical practices and their foundations. Yet, the collapse
of Euclidean certitudes, of over 2300 years, and the crisis in the mathematical analysis of the 19th
century, led to the exclusion of “geometric judgments” from the foundations of Mathematics. After the
success and the limits of the logico-formal analysis, it is necessary to broaden our foundational tools and
re-examine the interactions with natural sciences. In particular, the way the geometric and algebraic
approaches organize knowledge is analyzed as a cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural issue and will be
examined in Mathematical Physics and Biology. We ﬁnally discuss how the current notions of mathe-
matical (phase) “space” should be revisited for the purposes of life sciences.
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nition gamma, “the extremities of a line are points”). The intersection point of these
circles centered on the end points is obtained by the intended continuity of lines, a
well-established notion since the lively debate between Parmenides and Heraclitus
in the Greek Agora and the later atomistic response by Democritus. Euclid's lines
are the result of a continuous gesture, a construction, a continuous movement with a
compass in this case: in this sense, we understand that Euclid's proof are “dia-
grammatic” and “object dependent”, as observed in Panza (2012). Thus, the two
lines (a line is a “length with no thickness”, deﬁnition beta), produce, by intersec-
tion, a point, which has “no parts” (deﬁnition alpha; a “semeion”, a sign, in the
original terminology of Euclid). In other words, in Euclid, a point is a position, a
semeion, on a line, it is given as the result of an intersection of two lines. We even
dare to say that this ﬁrst theorem at once gives also an implicit deﬁnition, or clar-
iﬁcation, of what continuity for a line may mean: a line with no thickness is
continuous if, when it intersects, in good conditions, another line with no thickness,1. The geometric intelligibility of space
«The primary evidence should not be interchanged with the
evidence of the “axioms”; since the axioms are mostly the result
already of an original formation of meaning and they already
have this formation itself always behind them» (Husserl, The
origin of Geometry, 1933).
Humans have been since long organizing and giving meaning to
space. This was done by action, gestures and language. Mathe-
matics, Geometry in particular, provided the most stable concep-
tual reconstructions of phenomenal space. By phenomenal space
wemean the space onwhich phenomena manifest themselves. It is
the constructed interface, ﬁrst singled out by our senses, between
us and natural processes and onwhich we draw their contours and
dynamics mostly by mathematical tools. We will try to ﬁnd a
methodological unity to the highest moments of this construction,
when geometric tools uniﬁed, and still now unify, the space of
senses and physical space as well as different forms of mathemat-
ical understanding of space.
To this aim, and by a rather arbitrary choice, we will stress the
unity in the questioning posed by the geometries of Euclid, Des-
cartes, Riemann, and Alain Connes2: the issue here is not the
‘names’ of the mathematicians mentioned, nor their individual
contribution which may interest the historian, but the focus is on
the evolution of the notion(s) of space to which these theories have
contributed. This will allow us to focus on the issue of the mathe-
matical “space’’ (or, more generally, “phase space” or space of
‘’possible phylogenetic trajectories'’) which may be required for the
analysis of biological dynamics. The claim is that physical space, in
the paradigmatic approaches to geometry, and from our point of
view, is made intelligible by proposing different answers to similar
“questions”: How do we access space? How do we measure it? By
which operators do we act on it?
From a philosophical point of view, we aim to analyze the
merging of different scientiﬁc traditions and to explain the current
asymmetry between the role of mathematics with respect to
physics on one hand and to biology on the other. While a nuanced
historical work on individual mathematicians is important, for the
purpose of our project, we focus our attention on the changes in the
notion of space that have led to the constitution of physical space
using mathematics throughout history.
We base our interpretation of this evolution in part on Edmund
Husserl's book The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology (Husserl, 1933). In this book Husserl analyzes what
he calls the crisis of European Sciences as result of a forgetting of
their original constitution since Galileo. In the “Origin of Geometry’’
he works at the « original » constitutive gestures, in a broad his-
torical perspective, without searching for the actual « proto-
geometer ». In a similar spirit, we interpret some of the key prob-
lems of mathematization of biology as rooted in a forgetting of the
very possibility and constitution of mathematical physics and its
spaces. We use history as a prism that reveals elements of this
constitution as a way to understand origins and thus solutions to
our current problem.
History of science in our work is regarded as a continual process
that has led to the sciences we possess. We understand each in-
dividual's work as a part of this continuum, inﬂuencing on and2 1982 Field Medal, A. Connes works since the early '80's at the geometric
foundations of Quantum Mechanics.
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deeper understanding of a particular moment in history might be
gained through a reﬂection on a latermoment, on now in particular.1.1. Euclid
The geometry of Euclid is “just’’ a geometry of ﬁgures: nor space,
not even plane are “mathematized’’. Yet, the developments of
Euclidean Geometry provided us the tools to organize physical
space by rigid ﬁgures, drawn and handled by ruler and compass,
and their (rigid) movements. In Euclid's books, ﬁgures are drawn
and proofs are “shown” (ﬁrst theorem, book I: construct an equi-
lateral triangle on any straight line ... we all know how3). In fact, all
Euclid's ﬁve postulates are “constructive clauses”: draw a straight
line from any point to any point ... produce a circle with any center
and a distance ... and so on so forth. Moreover, each of these con-
struction maximizes symmetries, (see Longo, 2011b); this is the
“primary evidence that underlies the axioms” and allows further
constructions.
In Greek Geometry the role of seeing is crucial. “Theorem”
means “vision”, “scene”, from “theater”, also from the Greek word
“theoria”whichwaswhat “theoros” saw: theoros, the spectator, the
agent of the polis overlooking religious ceremonies from distance
without active participation. And so, to solve a mathematical
problem, then one has to distance oneself and think about the
problem from an impartial point of view. Moreover, symmetry, as
“equilibrium” and as a technical notion as well, is at the core of
Greek culture, in science, arts and religion. Thus, jointly to
constructive gestures in space, such as rotations and translations,
which are symmetries on the plane, this notion grounds both the
axioms and the proof, by enriching the logical deduction e yet
another invention of the Greek Agora.
The famous V postulate of the parallel lines, for instance, ex-
presses a key invariance property: in modern terms, it is equivalent
to “closure under homotheties”, as transformations enlarging or
reducing length in Euclidean space (its group of automorphisms
contains the homotheties). Then, a theorem, a property of a ﬁgure,
such as the value of the sum of the internal angles of a triangle,
remains valid by enlarging or reducing at leisure its length, surface,
volume ... from Democritus' atoms to stars. And the “local” or
“medium sized” space of senses is perfectly uniﬁed with physical
space, in the very large and in the very small. This property char-
acterizes Euclidean Geometry with regard to the non-Euclideanit produces a point. Only the formalist reading of Greek Geometry could claim that
this theorem is not soundly proved by Euclid, according to Hilbertian standards,
(see Heath, 1908) and one century long commentaries. Proofs instead are a his-
torical formation of mathematical sense, in this case largely grounded on deep
Aristotelian insight into the continuum of movement, (Panza, 2015).
atics and physics: A challenge for biology, Progress in Biophysics and
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4 We use Persian/Arabic, Middle Eastern and Islamic science interchangeably.
Given the geographical and historical changes, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd the right term
for this tradition. Some scholars use “science of the Islamic era”, some use “Islamic
science”, some “Arabic science”. But all of these are controversial given the drastic
changes in the region. We use Persian not as a term referring to language but to
culture. The history of Algebra and its relation to other sciences is rich and very
intricate. In this work, we only make a few and rather brief remarks o this matter.
5 Historians often call this verbal Algebra “rhetorical Algebra”.
6 Science or knowledge “ilm” in the Islamic tradition has essentially different
characteristics than its Greek counterpart. “ilm” is to be understood as that
“knowledge” which has practical consequences at some stages of its development.
Unlike the Greek tradition, knowledge is not limited to the theoretical and “pure”: it
is rather oriented toward action. Technique or practical knowledge for Islamic
tradition does not hold a lower status comparing to the theoretical knowledge. The
aim of “ilm”, understood in this way is not describing nature from a distance, as it
were, but gaining knowledge by acting upon it (Rosenthal, 1970; Rahman et al.,
2008).
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In summary, in Euclidean geometry, constructions may be done
by ruler and compass, thus by rotations and translations (which are
symmetries of the plane): these “tools” make ﬁgures and mea-
surement possible by a ratio to a given length and, thus, they make
space mathematically measurable. These elementary gestures
organize space, they allow us tomeasure it, to operate on it. Nothing
else is needed. In this process, geometric objects as ideal objects –
points, line segments, circle – were constructed, as the result of a
mythical construction, the “seeing” (“idein”) of objects in a Platonic
realm, (Vernant, 1983). So the line as “a length with no thickness”
(deﬁnition beta) has no physical counterpart, it is a focus on pure
measuring. A true origin and foundation of western geometry, it is a
limit, an imaginary construction. By the absence of thickness, it
allowed an invariant measure of surfaces e what is otherwise the
surface of a plane ﬁgure with borders of some thickness? Greek
Geometry is thus grounded on the invention of the very difﬁcult
notion of “border” (see Thom's work on cobordism). Through this
ideal, limit language, the subjectivity that is otherwise present in
our experience of the world is overcome and replaced with an
objective, shareable, understanding of ﬁgures, surfaces and, thus
and later, of space: the ideal, remote theater looked upon by the
theoros. This “objective” knowledge, then, is preserved and passed
on through gestures (Cha^telet, 1993), speech and writing, from one
generation to another, without the need to repeat the original
formation of these “pure” objects and their sense (Husserl, 1936).
The role of measurement by ratios, the abstract notion of “length”,
ground Greek geometry in a metaphysics of knowledge that still
now play a role in the most advanced mathematical constructions,
in particular those which organize space and time.
1.2. Descartes
Descartes' geometry may be soundly seen as a conservative
extension of Euclid's geometry (Panza, 2011). However, in
Euclidean geometry we have at most the construction of the third
power, where the ﬁrst power is a line segment, second a square and
third a cube. The higher powers had no geometric equivalent, ge-
ometry understood as Euclidean geometry. This problem was
solved in Cartesian geometry where a new conception and deﬁni-
tion of product as well as extended methods of construction were
accepted.
Inﬂuenced by algebraic methods developed since the 9th cen-
tury (see below), Descartes “algebraized” Geometry and founded
analytic Geometry (or more accurately, he invented a geometrical
algebra where one studies curves deﬁned geometrically). In this
Geometry, unlike the synthetic Geometry of Euclid, one does not
need to go to higher dimensions to represent the product of two
magnitudes. For instance, in Euclidean Geometry prior to Descartes
the product of two line segments was considered to be a plane
ﬁgure, and the product of three line segments a solid and so on. But
in Cartesian geometry, it becomes possible to understand the
product of line segments as another line segment, thanks to the
new deﬁnition of product. In this way, it was possible to construct
geometrically on a two-dimensional coordinate system every
polynomial.
While Euclidian geometers used ruler and compass to construct
shapes, Descartes’ approach allows to understand “lines” also as the
result of a point by point construction or drawing: “If then we
should take successively an inﬁnite number of different values for
the line y, we should obtain an inﬁnite number of values for the line
x, and therefore an inﬁnity of different points, such as C, by means
of which the required curve can be drawn” [Descartes, 1954, p. 34].
Then Euclidean ﬁgures, circles, triangles,… turned out to be but
a special case (at most degree two) of Cartesian curves. Yet, inPlease cite this article in press as: Islami, A., Longo, G., Marriages of mathem
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ordinary, though abstract, experience of dimension and action in
space of senses. Moreover, the correspondence of algebraic formula
and geometrical shapes, gave Geometry a symbolic representation,
which was much easier to manipulate. That is, the organization and
action on space was thus enriched by new algebraic tools. In
particular, the correspondence between curves and equations was
thought to allow for the geometric representation of not only every
polynomial but also eventually every function, after the invention
of differential and integral calculus. It was this Geometry that later
allowed Newton and Leibniz to develop their ideas of derivative
and integral, a new tool for making physical trajectories mathe-
matically intelligible.1.3. Al-Khwarizmi and the middle eastern tradition
What partially made it possible for Descartes tomove away from
Euclidean Geometry to analytic Geometry was Algebra, which was
originally developed in Persian/Arabic tradition4 beginning with
the work of al-Khwarizmi. While an unsystematic collection of
problems and algorithmic solutions existed as early as the Rhind
Papyrus c. BC 1700, and was thought to be an extension of arith-
metic in Ancient world and Medieval India, it was not until the
work of the mathematician al-Khwarizmi in the 9th century that
Algebra was invented as a systematic and rigorous branch of
mathematics. This Algebra was not symbolic but verbal, where the
problems and their step-by-step solutions were expressed using
words.5 Unlike his predecessors, al-Khwarizimi did not start with
speciﬁc problems to solve but with an a priori classiﬁcation of all
equations (linear and quadratic). The book begins by six classes of
equations and the introduction of his primitive terms.
The classiﬁcation of equations is a very important methodo-
logical aspect that distinguished al-Khwarizmi's work from prior
treatises that used algorithmic methods. The consolidation of Is-
lamic empire in the 8th century led to, among others, the con-
struction of an Arabic dictionary, which involved an “a priori”
classiﬁcation of all possible combinations. Thanks to a theologically
neutral view of language, which put the “divine” language of Quran
and the language of “pagans” on the same footing, lexicography
was done by a priori methods, an art and a science at once.
Moreover, the development of civil laws in the 8th century ac-
cording to Quran's dictum led to the establishment of schools of
jurisprudence and the need for new and intricate methods of
calculation. Yet once again, art (technique) and science went hand
in hand. Algebra's practical purpose did not prevent it from being a
science and vice versa.6
While Euclid's Elements was concerned with geometric objects
in a rigorous logical (deductive) system, al-Khwarizmi's book “al-atics and physics: A challenge for biology, Progress in Biophysics and
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problems helpful in Geometry and Arithmetic, which are useful in
practical matters such as commerce, distribution, inheritance, law,
etc. To solve these problems, al-Khwarizmi invented the new
mathematical notion of “shay”, the Arabic word for “the thing”, “the
unknown” (later cosa in Italian) which applied to arithmetical and
geometric quantities alike (Al-Khwarizmi, 1915). Note that in the
8th century three major schools for jurisprudence (“Hanaﬁ”,
“Shaﬁ'i”, “Maliki”) were developed to (re)construct civil laws about
will, inheritance and distribution according to the instructions of
Quran. These often needed a complicated calculation and as a result
some jurists/mathematicians wrote “hisab al-wasaya” designed
speciﬁcally for this task. Thework of al-Khwarizimi not only further
developed and put such calculations on strong, apodictic founda-
tions, but also created a completely new area of mathematics,
which contributed to bridge the gap between Arithmetic and Ge-
ometry. His work marked the beginning of a six-century long
proliﬁc research on Algebra, the relationship between Hellenistic
tradition of Geometry and Babylonian Arithmetic and their recon-
struction through the application of Algebra (Rashed, 1996). In
Algebra, in contrast to Geometry, one does not “see” the proof from
distance, but “performs” the calculation in order to arrive at the
solution. It is only after carrying out such algebraic operations as
“jabr” (restoration/elimination of a negative quantity from both
sides of an equation) and “moquabala” (addition of a quantity to
both sides) that one reaches the result, and replaces “shay” with its
reference.
This tradition was further developed after al-Khwarizmi in two
major schools, one arithemetized Algebra and the other geome-
trized the very same Algebra. As a result of the work of Baghdad
mathematician Al-Karaji in “arithmetization”, the object of Algebra
became polynomial (Rashed, 2015). He extended arithmetical op-
erations to unknowns treating them similar to the known magni-
tudes. The Persian mathematician, astronomer, philosopher and
poet Omar Khayyam in the 11th and 12th century, founded the
geometric school and invented methods for solving equations (of
degree three) that were not solvable by the method of radicals. He
classiﬁed all types of third degree equations and also added time to
the list of quantities that can be treated algebraically. Starting from
arithmetical and geometric magnitudes, Algebra eventually
included a treatment of all possible quantities. In the words of
d’Alembert in 1751, “Algebra is the method of making general cal-
culations with every kind of quantity by representing them by very
universal signs”.7
Following this new trend, later mathematicians provided for
each and every problem two equivalent solutions based on the
method of algebraists (e.g. al-Karaji) and geometers (e.g. Khayyam).
More importantly, succeeding mathematicians expanded the the-
ory of equations to rational and then to irrational numbers (alge-
braic numbers, speciﬁcally). Moreover to solve cubic equations,
they appealed to methods other than construction by ruler and
compass and gradually used conic sections (e.g. Khayyam).8
Breaking from the ancient prohibitions that kept Arithmetic and
Geometry apart, in Algebra, rational, irrational and geometric
magnitudes were treated in the same way. This new “algebraic
object”, “shay” was so general that allowed over time the7 The signs, in Islamic era, weren't yet symbols but terms, such as “shay”(the
thing), “mal” (square), and “cab”(cube).
8 As Roshdi Rashed pointed out Khayyam's contributions to the theory of alge-
braic equations are very signiﬁcant including “two remarkable results that histo-
rians have usually attributed to Descartes: a general solution of all equations of
third degree by the intersection of two conics; and a geometrical calculation made
possible by the choice of a unit length, keeping faithful, in contrast to Descartes, to
the homogeneity rule.” (Rashed, 1996).
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to Arithmetic, Algebra to trigonometry, to Euclid's theory of
numbers and so on. Thus, this new conception not only broadened
the scope of mathematics in a completely unprecedented way (e.g.
invention of numerical analysis) but also provided the possibility of
its application to itself, cross disciplines.
Another signiﬁcant difference between this area of mathematics
and the Geometry of Euclid was the role of “seeing” in the Platonic
realm and the ontological commitment to “pure” objects as the
only legitimate objects of mathematics. While in Euclid's geometry
what mattered was “showing” and “constructing” by tracing
(“producing”, translates Heath, 1908), in and as a “theorem”, in
Persian/Arabic tradition the truth was not necessarily to be
grounded on sight. In Algebra, one doesn't see the solution but has a
“feeling” for the kind of possible manipulations and operations that
might get him to the solution (by an algorithm) (Kvasz, 2008).
Although al-Khwarizmi paired every algebraic procedure with a
geometric demonstration, as its cause “ila”, to ground its certainty,
the generality of “shay” and its indifference to the object towhich it
referred gradually opened the way for purely algebraic arguments,
with no need for geometric demonstrations.9 We see this method
especially in the “arithmetized” Algebra of al-Khwarizmi's succes-
sors such as al-Karaji. Transcending from the necessary construc-
tion in space opened the way for a new symbolic language inwhich
one was able to write a formula, which encompasses the order of
operations as well.
In the 17th century Europe, it was the success of this method
that facilitated a new form of “physical abstraction” which was of
great importance in the scientiﬁc revolution. In the modern phys-
ical abstraction one may need to remove “notionally” the material
substance e.g. air, as Aristotle could already do, but even gravitation
and friction, as Galileo did when imagining the modern inertial
movement, the asymptotic invention of the ﬁrst conservation
property. The invention of symbols for operations as well as con-
stants and variables in the works of François Viete and Rene Des-
cartes gave these abstractions a symbolic representation, which
revealed at once the generality of these equations and their algo-
rithmic solutions.
As already hinted, Descartes created a symbolic language rep-
resenting the unknown by x, y, z.., distinguishing the variables from
the constants, symbolically. This new language further revealed the
“universal” character of algebraic methods, showing that all
quantities can be treated in the same way; it was only their rela-
tionship that mattered (Kvasz, 2008). Descartes took a step further
by declaring that these “accidental”, “visible” qualities, as length, as
area, as temperature etc., are mere appearances, and the reality
hidden underneath is mathematical. He wrote in a letter to Mers-
enne in 1637: “Myentire physics is nothing else thanmathematics”.
The project is a full mathematization of physics as “res extensa”, the
primary attribute of material substance. In this mathematical space
(of coordinates) then the metric was deﬁned as the “distance” be-
tween every two points.
2. Pathological functions and the shaking of certitudes
The expression of curves by equations allows to establish a point
by point relation and, thus, provided a newmethod of constructing
curves. This was thought to allow for the geometric representation
of not only every polynomial but also, after the invention of dif-
ferential and integral calculus, of every function. As Leibniz wrote:
“Also if a continuous line be traced, which is now straight, now9 However, al-Khwarizmi treats irrational quantities arithmetically already in his
book and shows that this treatment is justiﬁed using geometric methods.
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mental equivalent, a formula or an equation common to all the
points of this line by virtue of which formula the changes in the
direction of the linemust occur. There is no instance of a facewhose
contour does not form part of a geometric line and which cannot be
traced entirely by a certain mathematical motion. But when the
formula is very complex, that which conforms to it passes for
irregular.” (Leibniz, 1686 p.3).
This paradoxical situation, which later led to the development of
fractal (iterative) Geometry and the expansion of the theory of
functions of a real variable, had important consequences. It created
a general suspicion among mathematicians about the reliability of
the intuition they had of these notions. In particular, the corre-
spondence between functions (more precisely analytic formulas)
and curves (as their geometric representation) was shaken by the
developments in the 19th century. Developments in real analysis,
such as the work of Fourier on the heat equation and its solution
(Fourier series) led to a class of functions that were not repre-
sentable by curves: a new intuition, as a novel mathematical insight
had to be constructed. While Fourier has proved that “almost”
every function is representable by an analytic formula (Fourier
series), it gradually became clear that the “exceptions” produce a
large class of functions: in fact the “smooth” functions are only a
very small class of functions of a real variable. These functions,
which were called “pathological” functions, were not constructible
geometrically at all, thus defying the strong intuition about the
relationship between Cartesian curves and functions (for example,
Weierstrass function which is continuous everywhere but differ-
entiable nowhere10).
Therefore, numerous attempts were made to move away from
existing intuition to new insights as a result rigorous proofs and
conceptual constructionswere produced. In thatmovement, we see
the rise of proofs of existence as opposed to algorithms that gave
the solution as a combination of analytic functions. Moreover as a
result of Lagrange's work in 1776 it was understood that some
differential equations have solutions that are “singular”, which
cannot be found by standard methods. As a result, Cauchy in his
lectures at Ecole Polytechnique, 1821, emphasized the need to prove
existence and uniqueness of solutions to differential equations
before studying their properties. Instead of attempting to ﬁnd their
solution as an analytical formula, he thought of them as a result of
an iterative process, “successive approximations” (Kvasz, 2008).
The appearance of these functions in the context of Fourier analysis,
and the subsequent work, led to more rigorous deﬁnitions of
function and integral. In the “reﬁned” deﬁnitions, a function does
not need to be continuous or constructible by the Cartesian
method. In this way, the set of Cartesian curves came to constitute
only a small, special subset of the set of all functions. So, Bolzano
and Dirichlet dared to deﬁne constant functions of dense subsets of
the real numbers, such as the rational numbers, acquiring a
different value elsewhere. There is no way to “see” or “draw” these
pathological functions, even less to relate them to physical dy-
namics. Then Cantor structured the real numbers by a new un-
derstanding of limits and convergence that allowed to frame
mathematically these functions. A newmathematical intuition was
then constructed, far away from the ancient imagination of the
Euclidean “drawn… produce … a line”.10 This seemed very puzzling since the derivative of a function at a point was
thought to give the direction of the corresponding curve at that point. If there were
no derivative for the function at any point, howwas one to draw or even conceive of
the curve? Mathematical imagination had to go beyond Euclid's continuous ges-
tures and trajectories.
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“geometrization” of physics, Riemann
The invention of new spaces for thought was stimulated by a
new synthesis, in mathematics. After the marriage of Geometry and
Algebra, we now brieﬂy revisit the encounter between Geometry
and Differential Analysis, the calculus of derivatives and integrals
invented by Leibniz and Newton. Then, in section 5, the triangular
relation to Algebra again will bring us to the XX century.
Riemann's main aim, in the 1850s, is to account for the unex-
plained Newtonian “action at a distance”. He tries to understand
gravitation (but electromagnetism and heat propagation as well) by
the “structure of space” (Riemann, 1854; see also Boi, 1995;
Bottazzini and Tazzioli, 1995). This revolutionary approach may
be partly found also in Gauss and Lobachevsky, but it reaches with
Riemann its highest mathematical unity, in particular, by general-
izing the Euclidean tools for measurement (the ruler and compass)
to the “rigid body” (the meter). It may be also seen as an extended
Cartesian project for the mathematization of physics, by tools both
from geometry and differential analysis. But its physical motiva-
tions lead also to a physicalization of Geometry that opened the
way to Einstein and, then, to H. Weyl's work, a continual back and
forth between (Differential) Geometry and Physics.
One of Riemann's concerns is to understand under which gen-
eral conditions we may soundly measure. This is possible when
rigid bodies are preserved, as by moving a rigid “meter” one may
compare lengths. And here comes Riemann's general analysis of
curved manifolds, which shows that spaces (manifolds) of constant
curvature guarantee the invariance of measurement as the result of
the rigidity of bodies. Euclidean space is a particular case of these
manifolds, indeed a critical one, i.e. when the curvature is
constantly 0 (note also that Euclidean curves were only curves of at
most degree two in the Cartesian space).
Yet, the other spaces can make sense as well, since they can give
an account, by geodesics, of these mysterious actions at distance.
Riemann dares to think that «the concept of rigid body and of a light
ray, non longer are valid in the inﬁnitely small»11: bodies may be no
longer rigid, light may go along varying curves… The point is, and
this is one of his major results, that the metric structure of a (Rie-
mannian) manifold, or its measurement by a meter, may be bi-
univocally related to the its curvature (the metric tensor and the
tensor of curvature are related, in fully general situations). More-
over, it may make sense to analyze a continuous manifold of non-
constant curvature, as «the foundation of metric relations must
be found elsewhere, in cohesive forces that act on it». In other words,
forces between bodies are related to the (local-metric) structure of
space and, thus, to its (local) curvature. And this approach, writes
Riemann, «should be allowed if it would lead to a simpler expla-
nation of the phenomena». A 00divination”, will recall H. Weyl in the
‘20s, in reference to Relativity Theory: since Einstein's work, we
understand the relevance of this extraordinary insight of
Riemann's.
Thus, the new geometric organization of spaces is motivated by
physics andmay provide an understanding of physical phenomena,
beginning with the analysis of measurement and distance. Euclid's
ruler and compass is generalized for this purpose, since «... in a
continuous manifold the metric relations must be introduced on
different grounds». That is, the linear element, which grounds the
metric relations, does not need to be represented as the square root
of a second order differential form (Pythagoras theorem), but more
generally as ds2 ¼ Sgijdxidxj11 Riemann's quotations, in brackets, are from Riemann (1854).
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space, while understanding physical phenomena by Geometry.
Then spaces (manifolds) are proposed, as a “genealogy of mathe-
matical concepts”, bymaking explicit the hypothesis, which ground
the mathematical construction into a new phenomenal space:
some key hypothesis are, according to Riemann, connectivity,
isotropy, continuity … H. Weyl will add symmetries and their
groups as one of the fundamental properties that structure physical
phenomena, (Bailly and Longo, 2011).
Of course, by Riemann's distinction between the “local” and the
“global” structure of space (themetric structure and the topological
one, the latter related to the Cartesian dimension) a key aspect of
the unity of Euclid's approach is lost: physical space, the space of
microphysics (“the inﬁnitely small”) or astrophysical spaces may
have properties which escape our medium size experience of
senses and the resulting phenomenal space. In Riemann's
approach, the relation between local and global is the result of a
complex and novel mathematics: the gluing of local maps by dif-
ferential methods; homotheties, a group of symmetries, do not
allow any longer to transfer “bodily sized” experience and knowl-
edge to any scale.12 And this is extremely modern: from Relativity
Theory and Quantum Physics, we learned that access, measure-
ment and operations, in the very large and the very small, cannot be
provided by the naive analysis of senses. So while in Descartes, and
even in Euclidean geometry, we have a physical space that is con-
structed mathematically and “underlies” the space of human ac-
tion, with Riemann this is taken a step further, in a more signiﬁcant
separation of the space of ordinary, medium sized objects (space of
senses) from those of very large and very small, e. g. in astrophysics
and microphysics.
Yet, there is a unity in Euclid's and Riemann's approaches, in
their questioning, as described here. A synthesis is beautifully given
by Poincare (1913) in a sentence: «faire de la geometrie, c'est
etudier les proprietes de nos instruments, c'est a dire du corps rigide».
In short, the tools for measurement are at the core of the geometric
constructions.
4. Arithmetization of mathematics and the loss of meaning
The development of non-Euclidean geometries, where the par-
allel postulate was replaced by its negations, added to the overall
suspicion regarding direct relation between our geometric con-
structions and the spaces of senses. Jointly to the invention of
“pathological functions” (see sect. 2), this was yet another step
away from classical “intuition” and Geometry as both producing
and rooted in a unique phenomenal space, the complex result of
our action and conceptualization in and of space. Thus, the non-
Euclidean approaches to Geometry induced a profound crisis of
the 2300 years old Euclidean certitudes, which identiﬁed geometry
with phenomenal and even physical space, as such: measurement
and action here, under the control of our senses and intuition as
immediate “seeing”, could no longer be extended at all scales (the
exclusion of homotheties from the founding principles, the axioms,
see below).
Frege's deep investigations started the modern “royal way out”
from the novel problem of the gap between intuitive and
geometrical (Riemannian) space, between the intuition of move-
ment and trajectories and their mathematical treatment. (Mathe-
matical) Logic was explicitly opposed to foundational analysis
grounded on phenomenal space. «The wildest visions of delirium ...
remain so long as they remain intuitable, subject to the axioms of
Geometry » ... absolute certainty can only be recovered with12 Recall the role of Euclid's V axiom in closing his geometry under homotheties.
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it: «... the laws of arithmetic govern all that is numerable. This is the
widest domain of all; for to it belongs no only the actual, not only
the intuitable, but everything thinkable» (Frege, 1884, p. 20 and ff.).
Geometry itself (but Frege cautiously considers only Euclidean
Geometry) can be found analytically on the notion of number, as
relation between lengths (Frege, 1873, p. 9e10) (see the discussion
in Tappenden (1995)).
In a different way, this program was fully developed by the
subsequent work of Hilbert. His ﬁrst and main foundational
writing, (Hilbert, 1899), is a very relevant approach to the issue by
formal tools. The foundational problem is reduced to the analysis of
formal consistency: what only matters, in mathematics, Geometry
in particular, is the non-contradictory status of the axioms, with no
reference to meaning, in space in particular. By a remarkable
technical work, Hilbert gives all possible “relative consistency”
proofs in Geometry: insert an axiom, take another away (Euclidean,
non-Euclidean, Desarguesian, non-Desarguesian, Archimedean,
non-Archimedean ...) ... embed one system into the other. Beyond
Beltrami-Klein's work, the relative interpretations of Lobachevsky's
and Riemann's spaces in Euclid's are brought to the highest rigor
and generality. Then a ﬁnal masterpiece: set the basis to formally
encode, by analytic tools, Euclidean Geometry in a (conservative, in
modern terminology) extension of Arithmetic. The Kantian a priori
move from the intuition of (the constructive relation, wewould say,
to) space and time to the ﬁnitistic a priori of Arithmetic counting.
The following year in 1900, by posing, at the Paris conference, the
problem of consistency of Arithmetic, the scientiﬁc program of
formal foundation is fully given: no reference to meaning and
space, nor to the way we access, by measurement to knowledge of
it; just prove formally that the axioms of Arithmetic do not ﬁnitely
entail “0 ¼ 1”. This is the foundational problem of mathematics,
including Geometry, of course, since the latter, by encoding, is a
logical subsystem of Arithmetic.
The extraordinary “tour de force” of Hilbert's is much appreci-
ated by many, including Poincare. In his review of Hilbert's 1899
book, he acknowledges the technical achievement, but he stresses
as well the loss of meaning, the trivialization of our understanding
of space, the senseless reference to mathematics as codings of ax-
ioms into «le piano raisonneur de Stanley Jevons» from which «on
verrait sortir toute la Geometrie». Elsewhere Poincare, will refer to
this view of mathematics, which underlies the foundational pro-
grams of Peano, Padoa, Hilbert, as «la machine a saucisses de Chi-
cago»: from pigs and axioms produce sausages and theorems (see
Bottazzini, 1999).
5. The “physicalization” of geometry and the
“geometrization” of physics, Connes
A new synthesis of Geometry and Algebra, this time Abstract
Algebra, was brought about through Klein's Erlangen program in
1872. Underlying every geometry, Klein argued, is a symmetry
group that is fundamental to the constitution of space. Understood
in this way, geometry is the study of the properties that remain
invariant under a group of transformations. And the relationship
between different geometries must be understood as the rela-
tionship between their corresponding groups. This program at once
leads to a deeper unity of geometry (Euclidean, non-Euclidean or
other) and to a more abstract understanding of space, a step away
from the need to ﬁx a metric or to visualize a geometric space. This
had far reaching consequences for physics by taking groups, thus
abstract symmetries, as underlying the construction of suitable
spaces and phase spaces, from Relativity Theory to Quantum
Mechanics.
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thus, any metric space X, one may consider the set of continuous
functions, C(X), from X to the complex ﬁeld, as a suitable algebraic
structure (a commutative C*-algebra). C(X) is very important, as it
includes the space of measures on X.
A classic result of Gelfand allows to go the other way around.
Given a commutative C*-Algebra C, it is possible to construct a to-
pological space X, such that C(X) ¼ C. The points in X will be
characterized by the maximal ideals of C and so on and so forth as
for reconstructing the geometric structure of X on the grounds of
the properties of C.
In classical and relativistic physics measurements happen to
commute: the result of different measurement operations does not
depend on their order. This is not so in Quantum Mechanics. The
measurements of position and momentum, or of time and energy,
of a particle do not commute. And this is crucial: in Physics mo-
mentum and energy are the key observables, position and time are
the associated (“conjugated”) parameters. In Quantum Physics,
even more than elsewhere, measurement by instruments is the
only access we have to “physical reality”, that is to the pertinent
observables and parameters. More precisely, we can construct
empirical knowledge in microphysics only by setting up in-
struments for measurement. In this, there is a complete conceptual
continuity with regard to the approaches by Euclid and Riemann as,
in all cases, the tools for accessing and organizing space are the
result of a theoretical commitment, they set the direction of the
work. But the “instruments” of measurement in Quantum Me-
chanics do not have the relatively simple nature of the ruler and
compass, even not in the generality of Riemann's notion of “rigid
body” or of his “ds2”. Measurement is now given by the complex
physical and conceptual instruments of microphysics, and the only
“relative” grounding of certainty, which founds quantum me-
chanics, is given by a few measurable phenomena, where the non-
commutativity of measurement has a major role (as well as the
related indeterminism, which is intrinsic to the “standard” inter-
pretation). Knowledge construction is then “relativized” as it re-
quires the explicit action of the knowing subject, as well as a strong
theoretical project justifying the construction of the instruments.
And, in Connes' Geometry, the reference to Gelfand's algebraic
approach is at the core of the new geometrization of the
phenomenal space of microphysics. Yet, the physical issue of the
non-commutativity of quantum measurement introduces a radical
novelty as for this new geometrization.
As a matter of fact, as for the mathematics derived from non-
commuting measurements, Heisenberg ﬁrst replaced the algebra
of classical mechanics, where observable quantities commute, by a
new “calculus of matrices”, as it was later acknowledge by Born,
where observable quantities do not necessarily commute. In short,
his Algebra of matrices is obtained from a groupoid, which replaces
the classical (commutative) group of measurements. Now, this
latter group gives Connes' starting structure to reconstruct space, a
la Gelfand. Thus Connes' work, since many years, consists in rein-
venting Geometry from a non-commutative (C*-)algebra: beginning
with measurable spaces, to topological, metric and differentiable
ones (Connes, 1994). The differences are dramatic, as the very
notion of point and of trajectory are different from the classic no-
tions e technically, in non-commutative geometry, there are no
more maximal ideals (and trajectories are closer to the “paths”
derived from Feynman's notion of path integral). At the core of this,
one may ﬁnd the generalization of the Euclidean key notion of
“line” and Descartes' “points”. This audacious generalization is the
remote heritage of the work by Dedekind and Noether and is at the
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Connes' approach is gradually giving an account of the mysterious
nature of some physical phenomena, at the level of microphysics,
including non-locality (a particle is not “located in a point”, in
Quantum Mechanics). A crucial issue is the dependence of the
reconstruction of a possible space for microphysics grounded on
the order of measurement: but measurement is how we access to
physical space.
In conclusion, beyond Riemann's rigid ruler and the “physical
forces acting on/in space”, but along the same epistemological lines,
also Connes' non-commutative Geometry is grounded on physical
properties or, more exactly, on the tools we access and measure
physical phenomena. Once more, Poincare may be quoted for his
insight. Even though it would be too much to attribute to him a
“divination” concerning the possible Geometry of Quantum Phys-
ics, yet he observed: «Des e^tres qui eprouveraient nos sensations
normales dans un ordre anormal, creeraient une geometrie
differente de la no^tre» (Poincare, 1902).
6. Some epistemological remarks on the geometry of physical
space
It should be clear that we have no other way to constitute sci-
entiﬁc knowledge of nature, but by starting from observable,
measurable phenomena, even when this observability has nothing
to do with our direct experience by senses. Jointly to the forms of
access to and construction of phenomenal spaceq, the algebraiza-
tion of Geometry and its conjunction to Differential Analysis added
more tools for our abstract constructions. As we learned from
Relativity and Quantum Physics, we may actually need to give up
the identity “(abstract) space of senses ¼ physical space”, as the
unique phenomenal space for scientiﬁc knowledge, so beautifully
proposed by Euclidean spaces and their closure by homotheties.
Knowledge in very large and very small scales is constructed
differently: no rigid ruler, no compass of “human size” may uni-
formly organize the spaces of galaxies and of quantum particles.
Their intelligibility and phenomenality cannot be grounded directly
in our senses, on our eyes, hands, by our movements and actions,
normalized by Euclid's rigid tools, but must be mediated by com-
plex instruments of observation and measurement. These in-
struments are themselves the result of complex “theoretical
commitments”, as they are set up on the basis of an existing or
proposed theory, or of strong hypothesis, beginning with the de-
cision to observe and measure “this and not that”.
In other words, the dramatic change, in Relativistic and Quan-
tum spaces, is related to cognition: the direct experience of senses
is no longer sufﬁcient to make physical space intelligible and unify
phenomena. Yet, there is a great unity in themethod. It is surprising
that we still have to digest this apparent cognitive discontinuity:
the “ontological” myth (Geometry is “space per se”) does not allow
to appreciate that the mathematical objectivity is in the construction
and not in an ontology. There is no such thing as “absolute space”,
but there is the objective reconstruction of a space of action, by the
cognitive subject, with the contingent tools of active experience:
the result are different phenomenal spaces, in search for a math-
ematical unity (such as the one between Relativistic and Quantum
spaces and their physics), yet grounded on a great methodological
unity. Objectivity is reached when the cognizing subject is able to
make explicit and relativize these constructions: ﬁx ﬁrst the tools
for measurement, then one or more reference systems or ‘view
points’ and a pertinent metrics, thus a scientiﬁc “perspective”. Then
the construction becomes objective by relativizing the perspective,
that is by analyzing which are the invariants with regard to theatics and physics: A challenge for biology, Progress in Biophysics and
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metrics). As long as the subject believes in absolute spaces
(Newton), in “absolute laws of thought” (Frege), in “views from
nowhere”, there is no foundation for knowledge, but an artiﬁcially
uniﬁed frame for illusory certainties.
In contrast to this, we stress that the method, from Euclid to
Riemann and Connes, via Descartes and thus the Persian/Arabic
tradition, is uniform and sound: access, measure and operate on
space, with the appropriate and explicitly given tools, and organize
it by one of our most beautiful conceptual constructions, mathe-
matics, Geometry in particular. Since Descartes, Geometry is a
complex blend of constructions of and in phenomenal space and of
algebraic abstraction, enriched, by Riemann, by differential tools.
Connes' approach, via Gelfand's algebras for geometry, is a further
step in this direction: from non-commutative algebras of mea-
surement to an adequate reconstruction of differential geometry,
(Connes, 1994).
For a further historical reference to the geometric perspective,
note that Poincare's critique of logicism and formalism proposes to
supplement the foundational investigations in mathematics «by a
genetic analysis», the analysis of a conceptual genesis or con-
struction (Heinzmann, 1998). His understanding of Geometry as a
genesis, beginning with the movements of rigid bodies, speciﬁes
Riemann's approach to mathematics as a “genealogy of concepts”
as well as Helmholtz's reference to “facts” (see Nabonnand, 2001);
it is not an empiricist view nor naively rationalist, but a
“phenomenological” understanding (cf. below and (Husserl, 1933),
(see Nabonnand, 2000) for more references along these lines).
Mathematics is not grounded on arbitrary conventions: these
conventions are the most convenient choices («les plus comodes»,
writes Poincare) for us, human beings, in this world, with our
shared biological being. Poincare's program, as we understand it, is
a preliminary step to ground mathematics in our reference to the
regularities of the world that we see, that wemay act on, beginning
with symmetries, from Euclid to contemporary Mathematical
Physics. In short, we draw mathematics on the phenomenal veil on
the grounds of our active, cognitive experience. The structures of
mathematics are conceptual proposals, meant to make this world
intelligible («Si [la nature] offrait trop de resistance, nous cher-
cherions dans notre arsenal une autre forme qui serait pour elle
plus acceptable», (Poincare, 1899)). As pointed out in (Friedman
(2001); p. 26), «Poincare’s … “conventions” [are] free choices of
our own needed to bridge the irreducible gulf between our crude
and approximate sensory experience and our precise mathematical
descriptions of nature».
The role of acting, proposing, and understanding is crucial. The
resistance of nature, its friction against our active knowledge con-
struction, is deeply embedded in its speciﬁc materiality and in our
contingent biological and cognitive being, in the historical forma-
tion of sense. The point is, let's admit it, that “any constitution is
contingent” and the historical constructions of mathematics do not
escape from this. Yet, objectivity is reached by the methodological
unity (invariance, one should say) of the constructions and its rel-
ativization: the Greek “theoros” must step back from his/her view
point, look from a distance, not from “nowhere”, but from an
epistemological and historical perspective, by a critique of the
method that allowed him/her to propose the view point and grasp
what is invariant w.r.to changing perspectives - this is their possible
methodological unity.
The foundational program we are sketching here is an episte-
mological one: it is an analysis of “how”we construct knowledge, or
of the “knowledge process”. In mathematics, spaces, objects andPlease cite this article in press as: Islami, A., Longo, G., Marriages of mathem
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tive grounds, beginning with the reference to the tools for mea-
surement, a key step in the construction of objectivity. Asymptotic
constructions, such as the Euclid's “line with no thickness”, which
need language and myths, then other symbolic forms, such as
Algebra and the asymptotes of Differential Analysis, bring further,
in the communicating community, towards new invariants the
objectivity of the construction, well beyond the subjective access to
phenomena.
This constitutive analysis has been programmatically dis-
regarded by the logicist and formalist approaches to the foundation
of mathematics, in the XX century, as they only focused on (logico-
formal) proofs. This was a necessary investigation, but, unfortu-
nately, it excluded the analysis of the constitution of concepts and
structures, from Euclid's line and its transformations by symme-
tries (rotations, translations) to Poincare's, Weyl's and Gro-
thendieck's approaches, beyond the ones we hinted to in this text
(see Zalamea, 2012; Longo, 2015). The logical and formal ap-
proaches pretended to found and encode the world on integer
numbers, viewed as “an absolute concept”, as in the Fregean
tradition, or on countable strings of meaningless symbols,
following Hilbert. Now, there is no doubt that mathematics is ab-
stract and symbolic, but the one century long identiﬁcation of these
two deep notions with a “logic of integers” or with “formal”
excluded epistemology and then meaning from the foundational
analysis. We have to broaden the foundational project to the
“constitutive path” of mathematical abstract structures, beginning
by their meaningful grounding in (and their organizing) phenom-
enal space and time. These are proposed at the interface between
us and “reality” by an active construction of concepts and struc-
tures, a result of both gestures and actions in space and of language,
including the language of Algebra.
7. Biological spaces and dynamics
Through the mathematical organization of phenomenal space
we constructed, along history, the mathematical spaces of physical
dynamics. Let's now focus on life processes and on some mathe-
matical challenges posed by them. These processes are ﬁrst of all a
spatio-temporal matter. The dynamics of forms is at core of biology,
beginning with the three dimensional structure of DNA and the
folding - unfolding of proteins, which massively depend on di-
mensions and physico-chemical contexts. Proteins are not “alive”,
but they are the “bricks of life” e yet, in no way, by knowing all
physico-chemical details of bricks one understands, say, the ar-
chitecture of a building.
The analysis of the spatial organization is the ﬁrst step towards
appreciating the complexity of structures whose functionality is
entirely lost by any sort of “linear encoding”, such as the description
on the tape of a Turing Machine, with its key distinction between
hardware and software. Turing ﬁrst, in his 1952 morphogenesis
paper, analyzed the non-linear dynamics of an action/reaction/
diffusion system as an at least two dimensional continuous process,
that he opposes to his own “discrete state machine”, whose
deterministic dynamics reminds him of Laplace's predictability,
(Turing, 1950). Turing's analysis is grounded on the sensitivity to
border conditions of the system on “the onset of instability”, which
unfolds by “catastrophic instabilities” in continua and by dynamics
deformations of a purelymaterial hardware. This “falsiﬁes”, says he,
the need of instructions to “trigger” a purely bio-physical process
(no “new hypothesis”), (see Turing, 1952) where he quotes, as bi-
ologists, only Child, D'Arcy Thompson, Waddington by theiratics and physics: A challenge for biology, Progress in Biophysics and
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far from any genocentric views, thus from the encodings on discrete
data types that he had invented.
Moreover, beyond the essential three dimensionality of organ-
isms and their intrinsic materiality,13 living entities also require
multi-scale analyses. In some cases, living entities may develop
fractal structures and the mathematics of fractals is partly multi-
scale. Starting at one level of “magnitude” one may go to ﬁner and
ﬁner insights into phenomena, at different scales. But the law is just
one, indeﬁnitely iterated. As we mentioned in sect. 2, the arrival at
fractal geometry itself is a result of the appearance of pathological
functions in mathematics, which could not be treated with the
usual methods of analysis.
There exist very effective descriptions of vascular and respira-
tory systems as fractals (see Brown andWest, 1999; Nonnenmacher
et al., 1994; Bailly et al., 1994 for example). Maximizing exchange
surfaces and irrigation volumes yields a mathematical law that
gives the general pattern. These are peculiar situations where life
forms are organized by a “forced” growth phenomenon, an
expanding tissue under a physical constraining force, and the
analysis may be largely physical, as for the wax in a beehive or the
shells of some invertebrates. Yet, tissues and organs are made out of
cells that reproduce with variation, the ﬁrst principle in Darwin's
approach, they are not just “soft matter” shaped by forces, like wax
or shells. Then biological variation steps in and requires a ﬁner
analysis, (see Montevil et al., 2016b). In particular, the “irregular-
ities”, due to variability and diversity in biological fractals, both
within an organism and between different organisms in a species,
may be functional, as they contribute to adaptivity (Montevil et al.,
2016a). We thus need to enrich the mathematical analyses that
guided our invention of physical spaces, with their dimensional
and, possibly, fractal properties. One of the challenges then would
be to integrate the categorical/hierachical approach in (Ehresmann
and Vanbremeersch, (2007), Simeonov and Ehresmann (2017))
with the appreciation of the “speciﬁcity” of the biological object vs
the “genericity” of the categorical one, of the role of adaptivity
grounded on diversity and variability, of “constraints” in canalizing
biological randomness, from bio-resonance to symmetry breaking,
as described in Longo and Montevil (2014), Soto and Longo (2016).
As an informal and preliminary attempt toward this aim, let's
just examine one of the aspects mentioned and view the living as
an alternating hierarchy of at least two organization levels:
autonomous biological individuals (cells), functional groups of
them (organs), which in turn are integrated in a higher level and
unity by their physiological functions (and yield a new living unity).
In (Bailly et al., 1994; Longo et al., 2012), it is observed that, in
physico-mathematical terms, fractals geometries can be typically
found in organs and are related to their function, that is the ex-
change of energy or matter (or of their gradients), while the in-
teractions of biological units may be abstractly associated to
dynamical systems and be embedded in categorical/relational hi-
erarchies, (Simeonov and Ehresmann, 2017). That is, mathematics,
by Fractal Theories, may give a good account of the relation be-
tween structure and function in organs (lungs, vascular system ...),
while, as for living units, this relations are better analyzed, when-
ever possible, in terms of dynamical and physiological relations and13 Organisms are made of a speciﬁc physical matter: the bases of DNA, the mo-
lecular components of membranes have no alternatives, in a space that we strictly
understand in three-dimensions. Synthetic biology extracts and re-combines
fragments of DNA, or their exact chemical replica, and places them in cellular
membranes with their proper physico-chemical and dimensional structure. The
dualistic perspectives, software vs. hardware, or soul vs. body, are a fantastic in-
vention for the purposes of computing with machines, or a strong religious
commitment, respectively, but do not need to be projected on nature.
Please cite this article in press as: Islami, A., Longo, G., Marriages of mathem
Molecular Biology (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2017.09.constraints, (see Montevil and Mossio, 2015). But an organ is
composed by tissues that are generated by cells, which, as all or-
ganisms, reproduce with variation, (Montevil et al., 2016a). Then,
the physical forces, e.g. the ﬂow due to the pumping hearth,
constrain cellular reproduction. That is, those physical forces are not
the “primary motor” of the fractal structure of, say, the vascular
system: they canalize and constrain the proliferating and moving
cells (an original analysis based of this “reversing” of principles is in
Montevil et al. (2016b)). Note also, that variability is at the core of
biological diversity that is a fundamental component of the stability
of life: diversity in an individual organ, or between the same organ
in different individuals, as we said, contributes to the stability by
adaptivity of an individual or of a population, (Montevil et al.,
2016a; Longo, 2017).
Note, that even within cells, the least living entity, one may ﬁnd
organs: the external membrane and the cytoscheleton, ﬁrst, but
also some sort of internal membranes and “rails”, microtubules,
that play a key role in organizing cells' metabolism and reproduc-
tion. Their formation as well must be analyzed as constrained
reproductionwith variation: in recent experiments in microgravity,
proliferating yeast cells produce very irregular cytoscheleta,
(Bizzarri et al., 2014). On Earth, gravitation constrains their forma-
tion - and (negatively) selects themwhen they are not viable in our
gravitational ﬁeld.
This is just the beginning of a view of complexity of organisms
where themathematical tools commonly used are already split into
different theoretical frames, according to the “scale” e cell, organ,
organism; each may have some descriptive value, but just for its
level of investigation. Moreover, these (already schematic) levels,
interact vertically and thus yield a novel, essentially multiscale
system: when the scale changes, the mathematics we use for its
analysis changes as well (typically, from networks analysis of cells
to fractal structures of organs) and these nested levels are inte-
grated and regulate each other. The causal analysis needs to be
modiﬁed with regards to a purely physical dynamics: as we
observed, ﬁrst (cellular) reproduction with variation, then physical
(and biological) constraints acting on or canalizing, constraining
reproduction. But this requires an ongoing theoretical construction
which is the aim of the work hinted in Soto and Longo (2016).
Finally, “enablement”, i.e. the analysis of “what makes possible”
a given process, should be added to the analysis of causality, (Longo
and Montevil, 2014). For example, enabling contexts give the major
differences between in vivo and in vitro experiments. In a neuron,
say, the artiﬁcial ﬂuid of an in vitro experience and its being cut off
from three-dimensional connections etc. give lower ﬁring rates,
higher resistance, unreliable potentials ... (Jennings and Aamodt,
2000). In these cases, the arbitrariness of the physico-
mathematical modeling, a further abstraction from the context, is
even greater. The “intended” assumptions are very numerous and
mostly out of control, as most are implicit: in an organism almost
everything is correlated to almost everything e de-correlation
analyses, as the ones done in physics, are extremely hard, some-
times impossible. Sooner or later the researcher will acknowledge
that there are “hidden variables” not taken into account in the
model; often, this is due to interactions with other scales, out of the
scope of the given model. Thus, in contrast to Physics, Models in
Biology are always poorer than phenomena, or, more precisely, the
powerful correlations between the “genericity” of the mathemat-
ical and of the physical object (and “speciﬁcity” of trajectories) is
lost (is actually reversed) in biology, whose objects are speciﬁc
(historical) and trajectories are “generic” (possible ones), (see Bailly
and Longo, 2011; Longo and Montevil, 2014) for a detailed analysis.
All of this stresses the need for a proper “biological theorizing” and
a critical perspective in modeling, based on biologically soundatics and physics: A challenge for biology, Progress in Biophysics and
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invention15
All these issues (context dependence, multiscale interactions)
pose major challenges to mathematics in Biology, as theoretical
generality is also our aim. In Physics, this is “more easily” obtained
by mathematics' constitutive role in drawing the very “conceptual
contours” of physical objects and by the possible or discernible
context independence of physical experiences, while both condi-
tions essentially fail in Biology. Thus, the gap between the “local”
nature of Models and the required “global” nature of Theories is
much greater than in Physics. Moreover, Mathematical Biology
seems to provide only models, so far e to be evaluated critically
(see the footnote and reference above). As a matter of fact, even
modeling, which is so important for iterating experiences, trans-
ferring knowledge ... conjecturing Theories, is very hard. Consider
“latent potentials” in Evolution. There is, for example, strong
paleontological evidence that the double jaw of some reptiles,
living 200 millions years ago, originated the inner ear of birds and
mammals (Gould, 1982, 1989). How can you model this? Which
energy is minimized, if any, or which geodetics, in which mathe-
matical space onemay simulate such a contingent evolution? There
exist dynamic models of co-evolutive systems, as they are called,
but, before discussing the problems they are faced with, let's
consider another, related, feature of life.
In Physics, we know how to deal with states close to as well as far
from equilibrium; but also critical states are well deﬁned and
treated. By deﬁnition, the latter are “temporary”: a physical system
doesn't stay long in a critical state (on the verge of a change of
state). Yet, living entities, both biological units and species,
permanently live in an “extended critical state”, (Bailly and Longo,
2011). Waddington's homeorhesis or Varela's autopoiesis, (Petitot
et al., 1999), are early theoretical appreciation of this fact; where
homeorhesis means a dynamical reconstruction of an ever chang-
ing equilibrium, which is autopoietic when it is internally recon-
structed by a process that engenders its own constraints (Montevil
and Mossio, 2015). In short, we live as if we were running on a tight
string, by continual adjusting the constraints on a critical trajectory;
and organisms do it quite well, and so do species, at least for some
time. There is no such thing as “equilibrium” in phylogenesis nor in
ontogenesis: a non-artiﬁcial ecosystem is never in equilibrium, it is
always evolving. Only death in a desert of stones is biological
“equilibrium”.
Many physicists work at co-evolutive dynamical systems in
Biology and, by powerful mathematical tools, they try to model
features like the ones above. The problem is that there is no pre-
designed space of phases,16 that is a space of the possible14 As mentioned above, a tissue, an organ is not made by soft, inert matter, as it
happens also when the latter is produced by an organism (e.g. wax cells or shells).
Physical forces constrain the growth of a tissue, an organ, but they do not complete
determine its shape, as in most existing models of morphogenesis, since Turing’s
1952 seminal paper and Thom's work. Assuming ﬁrst the Darwinian principle of
“proliferation with variation” for cells, even within an organism, leads, in
morphogenesis, to an original and more effective perspective also in modeling, (see
Montevil et al., 2016b; Montevil, 2017).
15 This section as well as other parts authored by Longo in this paper, in particular
the idea of “changing phase space” as for biological dynamics (see below), is taken
from G. Longo “Space and Time in the Foundations of Mathematics, or some
challenges in the interactions with other sciences”. Invited lecture, First AMS/SMF
meeting, Lyon, July 2001 (unpublished manuscript, downloadable; partly pub-
lished in French, in Intellectica, 2003/1e2, n. 36e37).
16 The space of pertinent observables and parameters. This is the idea hinted in
the 2001 paper quoted in the previous note.
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phase space is co-constituted at the same time as the phenomenon
to be described. Since Newton, as analyzed by Kant, one must give
ﬁrst the very conditions of possibility for the intelligibility of physical
dynamics: the “a priori” of space and time. In the XIX century, these
a priori for the physico-mathematical constructions where gener-
alized to the notion of “phase space” (Hamilton, Gibbs, Poincare…),
ﬁrst given by position and momentum. Then the preliminary,
difﬁcult and fundamental task of the theoretician in physics
became the invention of the suitable “phase space” for the intended
analysis. This mathematical space moved from the position/mo-
mentum (or energy/time) space of classical dynamics to the more
complex phase spaces of thermodynamics (Bailly and Longo, 2011).
Note that the position/momentum and energy/time spaces of
classical dynamics yield also the “conjugated variables” of quantum
physics, where the indetermination of measurement was proposed.
Later, an even more abstract complex Hilbert space, of inﬁnite di-
mensions and where the quantum dynamics is the dynamics of an
amplitude (a “law”) of probability in Schr€odinger's equation,
(Bitbol, 1996).
The historicity of biological evolution is grounded on the
changes of the very “phase space”, that is on the changes of the
pertinent Darwinian observables (phenotypes, thus organisms and
species) and of the pertinent parameters, while rare events scan
any phylogenetic trajectory, (Longo, 2017). These observables
depend on each other, while interacting with billions of other
phenomena, as unpredictable as the one above (the “latent po-
tentials”). And this, along an extended critical state. Are there just
“hidden variables”, or missing parameters, to be discovered and
inserted in the model? There seems to be more than this. Minor
variations in the evolutive context, a mutation say, may create a
new phase space: attractors which should describe the dynamics,
not only need to be embedded in larger spaces (more variables), but
seem to “swing” into different and co-constituted phase spaces. How
to handle mathematically these changes, which may be “concep-
tual” changes?We are in a situation similar to the multiscale nature
of biological phenomena, mentioned in x. 7 (and surely related to
it), but with its own mathematical difﬁculties. Mathematics and its
applications grew by proposing novel conceptual frames, as pointed
out also throughout recent history by Patras (2001), possibly
grounded in new forms of “access” to phenomena (in our sense
above) or to new objects of knowledge.
We should try to give a rigorous interpretation of the gap be-
tween (the use of mathematics in) Physics and Biology, at least
comparable to the one Quantum physicists proposedwith regard to
more classical approaches. Mathematics is an open conceptual
construction and may be indeﬁnitely enriched: fortunately, it is not
God given, nor it is all already contained in and mechanically
derivable from today's Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory or (predica-
tive) fragments of Second Order Arithmetic, as some logicians still
claim. When Newton and Leibniz uniﬁed metaphysically distinct
universes, the sub-lunar and the supra-lunar bodies and their
movements, they did not use the mathematics of projectiles well
developed by the engineers of the time, largely based on Greek
Geometry. They invented radically new concepts and tools, not
contained in Euclid's notions and axioms, and dared to use the
actual inﬁnite to analyze ﬁnite movement (trajectories, speed, ac-
celeration), a true revolution. Of course, there was a path through
History, which led to their ideas, as we hinted, but the dynamics of
mathematics swung by their work into a different conceptual
space, which included inﬁnitesimal analysis. And, by Gauss' and
Riemann's Differential Geometry, this also changed Geometry.
In the XX century, from Dirac's delta function to Feymann's in-
tegral and Weyl's Gauge Theory or non-Commutative Geometry,
radical mathematical novelty marked the construction ofatics and physics: A challenge for biology, Progress in Biophysics and
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17 An early mention of negative numbers may be found in China, in the “Nine
chapters on the art of mathematics” (Han Kingdom, 206 BCE e 220 AC): red strokes
for positive numbers, black ones for negative. A more consistent use is made by the
Indian mathematician Brahmagupta (598e668) in the Brahma Sphuta Siddhanta
(628), where both negative numbers and 0 are posited jointly to their basic alge-
braic properties (Seguit-Duclot, 2017).
18 The ﬁrst systematic treatment of Arabic numeral 1e9 and 0 and place-value
system is in al-Khwarizmi's book “Hindu art of reckoning”. While Hindus used
the word “Sunya” (empty or blank), he introduced “sifr”, “cipher”.
19 Note that for the geometric algebraists such as Khayyam, who remained faithful
to the necessity of geometric interpretation, accepting negatives was much more
difﬁcult.
20 Al-Samw'al writes, … if we subtract a deﬁcient number from a deﬁcient
number larger than it, there remains the difference [e.g. e 5 e (e 2) ¼ e (5e2)],
deﬁcient; but in the other case there remains their difference, excess. [e.g. e 2 e (e
5) ¼ þ (5e2)].” (Berggern, 2016).
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and in the role of mathematics in it. We tried to point out some of
the limits one encounters when treating biological entities with
tools from Physics (see Longo, 2017 for more), similarly as the ob-
jects or the Geometry of Classical or Relativistic Physics do not
apply to microphysics: either the objects become “strings”, like in
String Theory, or we need new understanding of space, like in non-
Commutative Geometry. Also in Biology, we need new conceptual
tools and possibly invent more suitable mathematics, as mathe-
maticians and physicists did in Physics, from Newton to Connes.
Typically, by their peculiar autonomy and contextual dependence,
we cannot easily draw their mathematics on the phenomenal veil
by “cutting them off” from their contexts and by giving them a
constructed contour. The organismal unity seem to impose itself
and the ecosystemic interactions produce the historical dynamics
of the phase space. This, we believe, is the underlying methodo-
logical challenge for mathematics in Biology.
9. Mathematical and epistemological projects
In the spirit of this special issue, we will now hint to some
possible work directions coming out from the proposed perspec-
tive. The central theme, on one side, aims at (re-)embedding
mathematics and its constructive practices in phenomenal space
and time, which mathematics contributes to constitute, also by the
rich blend of the geometric perspective and the algebraic approach,
since the encounter of the Greek and the Persian/Arabic traditions.
On the other, space and time may relate to the very foundation of
mathematics, which has been for too long isolated within the
enclosed terms of its internal foundation, since Hilbert's Meta-
mathematics is a mathematical discipline. By an enriched analysis
of biological space and time, mathematics may better relate to this
form of knowledge whose phenomenalities are ﬁrst of all a spatio-
temporal matter and require a synthetic insight on organisms.
9.1. Role of Algebra and modern unifying perspectives
In section one, we focused on the developments of Geometry
from Euclid to Descartes, emphasizing the role of Algebra in this
regard. We now draw on some comparisons between this tradition
in Algebra beginning with al-Khwarizmi and the disciplines of
Arithmetic and Geometry inherited from Babylonian and Greek
traditions. The purpose is to stress the historical, methodological
and conceptual, constitution of mathematics: when embedded in
different historical contexts or when facing new challenges,
mathematicians invented new tools and new mathematical struc-
tures, for the purposes of knowledge constructions. One of today's
challenges is the analysis of biological processes, since Darwin's
revolution, so far very poorly dealt with mathematical tools, or at
most dealt with one century old tools from mathematical physics,
even today, (see Longo, 2017). We need instead a similar creativity
as the one hinted above in the very rich historical relation between
mathematics and Physics or when dealing with practical needs. We
review it here by somemore hints towards a cross-cultural analysis.
The innovative role of Algebra in bridging the gap between two
mathematical traditions of arithmetic and geometry provided a
synthesis of mathematical entities that were considered to be
otherwise independent: numbers and magnitudes. This synthesis
was not the result of a mere conjunction of two inherited disci-
plines, rather a consequence of inventing a new mathematical
entity altogether. This new entity, “the unknown”, was so general
that it allowed at once geometric and arithmetic determinations.
The invention of this new entity was a consequence of, in part,
an ontologically neutral view of mathematics, which did not limit
mathematics to pure, ideal objects of the Platonic realm nor anPlease cite this article in press as: Islami, A., Longo, G., Marriages of mathem
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outlook on science or knowledge, which did not value the theo-
retical above the practical disciplines (“science” above “art”, see the
footnotes in sect. 1.3). On the contrary knowledge without action
and actionwithout knowledgewere both strongly condemned. This
“formal” ontology did not lower the status of Algebra to a mere
technique, a collection of algorithms for ﬁnding solutions to
equations but placed it between art and science. The algorithms
were ﬁrst (in work of al-Khwarizmi) carefully coupled with geo-
metric demonstrations, and later with independent (algebraic) ar-
guments for their soundness.
In doing Algebraic manipulations with the “unknown”, one is
invited to forget the properties of the entity to which the “un-
known” refers and instead to focus on the relationships between
different terms of the equation (known and unknown). In this way
Algebraic manipulations are done at a more “abstract”, “meta” level
and the subject of mathematical study shifts from magnitudes to
relations between them (and later to “structures” such as groups,
rings, ﬁelds, with the rise of Abstract Algebra).
The effectiveness of this “formal” algebraic entity, “the un-
known”, ﬁrst in legal matters and inheritance laws, as noted above,
opened the way to further applications of mathematics in other
sciences such as astronomy, mechanics, optics, etc. Gradually, with
the scientiﬁc revolution of the 17th century it enriched the onto-
logical commitment concerning the intrinsic mathematical nature
of the Universe (as in Galileo) by the use of abstract algebraic
computations. Algebra provided the formal tool for the expression
of physical laws as relations between quantities of different kinds,
replacing the geometric theory of proportions. The writing of the
laws was based on observations and meaningful insights, and once
laws were written the computations were done in formal algebraic
or analytic fashion.
This ontologically neutral attitude led, among others, to the
acceptance of zero and gradually to the development of an arith-
metic for negative quantities.17 While conceiving zero encountered
a fundamental obstacle with Greek ontological commitment as
nature rejects the void, for algebraists it created no problem and
was freely used by al-Khwarizmi in the system of Arabic numerals
(base 10) that we still use today.18 As for negative numbers the
process was slower partially because the algebraists didn't have a
use for them. With the arithmetization of Algebra and the devel-
opment of arithmetic for known and unknown quantities alike, as
we discussed in 1.3, negatives gradually came to be treated similar
to positives (under arithmetical operations), also following the
Brahmagupta tradition.19 The physician al-Samaw'al in the 12th
century completed the project that al-Karaji has started in the
arithmetizaion of algebra: he deﬁned algebraic power (including an
unknown to the power zero) and recognized negatives as “deﬁ-
ciency” and positives as “excess” (Berggern, 2016).20atics and physics: A challenge for biology, Progress in Biophysics and
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ometry, based on constructions by ruler and compass, led to the
possibility of proving negative results: the “impossible” solutions.
The Persian mathematician Nasir al-Din al-Tusi in the 12th century,
for instance, in his book “The Equations”, classiﬁed equations into
two groups of possible and impossible (ones with no positive so-
lution), and for the latter provided reasons as why these equations
are “impossible cases”.21 Of course, the “impossibility” of these
equations is only the result of the limitation of the “world of
Algebra” to real numbers (as we classify them today). With the
invention of imaginary numbers (Cardano, XVI century) and of the
geometric interpretation of complex numbers as vectors and points
on the plane (Wessel, Wallis, Argand and Gauss, XVIII and XIX
century), every polynomial turns out to be a “possible” equation.
These representations made it possible to legitimize the use of
these solutions, and to ﬁnally prove the fundamental theorem of
Algebra for every polynomial of degree n on the “complex plane”
(Islami, 2017). It was in fact the dynamic interaction between
algebraic and geometric methods that enriched mathematics and
widened its possible applications.
While geometry, arithmetic and the theory of proportion were
widely used in modern physics since its conception in the 17th
century, Algebraic methods, jointly to analysis, gradually became
the dominant (although not the only) language of physics in the
19th century, all thewhile embedding physical processes in a sound
geometry of space (the physicalization of geometry and the
geometrization of physics we mentioned above). Typically, the
requirement of homogeneity of magnitudes, after the introduction
of (absolute) “unit”, turned into the discipline of “dimensional”
analysis, which is still of utter importance to the work of contem-
porary physicists. This is a complex blend of equational writing and
a geometric appreciation of the notion of “dimension”. Similarly,
representations, by diagrams, graphs and trees etc, provided geo-
metric insight and easier manipulations of combinatorial structures
and algebraic operators; conversely, the general analysis of con-
nected components and holes in surfaces was made possible by
Betti numbers and Poincare’s groups, leading to homotopy and
homology groups, as newalgebraic tools for Geometry, (Dieudonne,
1972; Patras, 2014).
Let's ﬁnally recall the further uniﬁcation by deep “transversal”
concept and structures, more recently proposed by Grothendieck
within pure mathematics, (see Zalamea, 2012 and Longo, 2015) for
philosophical reﬂections (the second also in relation to Biology).
This approach “goes across” Geometry, Algebra and Analysis, more
than unifying them: the notion of Topos, say, as an extreme
generalization of mathematical “space”, applies transversally and
sets the grounds for contemporary Algebraic Geometry.22 Evenwithin formal systems, normalization for typed lambda-calculi (see Girard
et al., 1989), as well as recent concrete incompleteness results, provide examples of
very interesting formally unprovable theorems of Arithmetic: they use well-
ordering properties of numbers, as judgments of a “geometric” nature, in the9.2. The epistemology of mathematics and the sciences of life
There is no doubt that there are logic and pure formalisms, in
mathematical proofs, yet their analyses are “necessary even though
they are not sufﬁcient” for a foundational project, as pointed out in
Weyl (1927); that is, the belief in their mathematical, or even
“cognitive”, completeness is wrong, as we tried to argue. The
analysis of the “mode of access” to phenomenal space, including
the various forms of measurement, is an essential component of an
epistemological reﬂection and contributes to open to new in-
teractions between mathematics and empirical sciences. The XX
century prevailing monomania of focusing only on the invariants of21 Both Khayyam and al-Tusi come close to Descartes' and Fermat's results. Yet,
without invention of a new method it was impossible for them to take these results
further.
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Concepts and structures are constituted in the interface be-
tween us and the world, on that phenomenal veil over which we
draw them in order to organize and make intelligible the world, by
mathematics. They originate on the regularities we “see”, as living
and historical beings, and develop along History, in intersubjec-
tivity and language. These constructions are not arbitrary, as “re-
ality” makes frictions and canalizes our knowledge dynamics. The
common cognitive grounds, proper to our shared humanity, give
generality and constitutive power to this procedure, enriched by
historical speciﬁcation and diversity. The objectivity of mathe-
matics is in this process.
The reﬂections proposed above, concerning the challenges for
mathematics in Biology, are not just meant as informal consider-
ations, but they are an attempt to analyze the peculiar interface by
which life presents itself to us. The mathematical analysis of the
difﬁculties should stimulate a foundational investigation on the
tools used and stress this constitutive role that mathematics has in
knowledge construction: these difﬁculties are due to the different
“autonomy”, criticality and multiscalar phenomenality of life, if
compared to the physical phenomena. In general, each analysis of
the interface between us and phenomena, within different forms of
knowledge or access to reality, bears a foundational character.
The focus on the issue of space is not meant to present a new
monomania, that of Geometry, but to enrich existing paradigms by
what was programmatically excluded by the founding fathers of
modern Logic, and for good reasons (at their time: we are no longer
troubled, today, by Riemann's Geometry and, perhaps, even not by
Connes'). Moreover, the mathematics of space and time are
“transversal” themes to different sciences; thus, the related foun-
dational and methodological considerations should be an essential
component of interdisciplinary researches. It is largely insufﬁcient
to transfer well-established techniques or algorithms from one
discipline to another. We have to be “monist of matter” not of the
“tools” for knowledge: different phenomenalities may need to be
analyzed by different tools. Yet, an explicit reﬂection on the
methodological differences and analogies may lead to a uniﬁcation,
which is never a matter of a transfer or superposition of techniques,
but of a new invention, a new synthesis. Since Newton and Boltz-
mann mathematical physics proceeds by “uniﬁcation”, that is by
the invention of a “third” theoretical frame unifying different
phenomenalities e as for Newton, recall the example mentioned
above of inﬁnitesimal analysis and the role of inﬁnity in it. Indeed,
the same could be said for Boltzmann 's statistical physics that
asymptotically correlated particles' trajectories and thermody-
namical properties. But also Connes' non-commutative Geometry, a
major advance forwards, uniﬁes previous approaches, in between
Relativistic and Quantum Physics, by new mathematical concepts.
Grothendieck's “transversal” correlations, bypassing the frontiers
of mathematical disciplines, is a further way to give unity to our
major tools for scientiﬁc knowledge, mathematics, along the lines
of the marriages we described in this paper.
The problem is opened on whether the immense conceptual
creativity of mathematics may help to move from the “a priori” stillproofs (see Longo, 2011a). Moreover, continuous “geometric” structures may step in
the inductive load of proofs of purely combinatorial properties of computable
functions and functionals (see “Four letters by Georg Kreisel” on this and subse-
quent work quoted in introduction to these letters, in http://www.di.ens.fr/users/
longo/ﬁles/FourLettersKreisel.pdf). Pure formalisms do not go very far.
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given phase space in each physico-mathematical theory) and in-
vent the new mathematical concepts and structures needed for
biology, possibly including a dynamics of the very phase space. The
historical co-constitutive relation between mathematics and
physics as well as the construction of mathematics for practical
aims with no ontological commitments, have been very rich of
these sorts of invention, as we hinted above. The conceptual frame
for biology hinted in Longo and Montevil (2014), Soto and Longo
(2016) and Longo (2017) is more radical as it is based on the pro-
posal of new “a priori” in biological theorizing, inspired by obser-
vations and grounded on principles of organization and of
variation, and on the peculiar, constitutive, role of historical time
and rhythms for organisms. Scientiﬁc observations, of course, are
not the contemplation of “empirical truth” nor “empirically real”
(whatever this may mean), as they include the observer's choice of
what and how to observe and measure, where to set the contours
and how to qualify the objects of analysis. Then the challenge we
tried to face is to “elevate” some crude observations (organisms,
including cells within an organism, proliferate with variation and
generate rhythms, along an historical time) to the status of
founding conventions, as Poincare would say, - or, to the status of
“coordinating or constitutive principles”, as soundly put in
Friedman (2001), by revisiting Poincare. If we go beyond the
physicalist prejudices in Biology, an even richer path may be
opened for new mathematics, with a similarly rich constitutive
power than the one physics has had for mathematics.
Theorizing or even philosophical reﬂections (both ontological
and epistemological) need to precede the mathematization, if the
latter is ever possible, as it was the case in classical and relativistic
physics, since Galileo and Descartes or Riemann and Mach, or in
quantum mechanics, where the theoretical debate always had and
has deep philosophical implications and preceded mathematiza-
tion. This is the attempt, as for a theory of biological ontogenesis
which precedes mathematical modeling. Some original modeling
techniques are already being designed following that theoretical
approach, as for organ morphogenesis, (Montevil et al., 2016b;
Montevil, 2017), typically by considering conceptually primary the
proliferation with variation of cells then the tissular dynamics un-
der the constraints of physical forces. Moreover, new, non obvious
mathematics is being proposed, partly inspired by the philosoph-
ical perspective mentioned here in biology, concerning the changes
of the very phase space, (see Sarti and Citti, 2017).Acknowledgements
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